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1 
 
As a region, 20
th (and indeed 21
st) century Latin America has been relatively free 
from international conflict. For all their entrenched rivalries and intermittent bouts of 
sabre-rattling, Latin American countries have rarely come to blows. Since the 1960s, 
the only full-scale international conflicts in the region have been the El Salvador-
Honduras war of 1969 and the Argentina-UK war over the Falklands/Malvinas in 
1982 (Holsti 1996), the latter of which can be seen primarily as a diversionary tactic 
on the part of a failing military dictatorship. The reasons for such stability are both 
circumstantial and cultural. Twentieth century Latin American governments have 
tended to focus their attention on domestic political stability, economic growth and, 
during the Cold War, national security – in part out of fear of U.S. intervention. Latin 
American governments have also traditionally given high priority to national 
sovereignty and non-intervention, and have adopted non-fatal attitudes to conflict that 
allow them to keep relations open despite tensions. South America in particular has an 
elaborate diplomatic system of legal norms and a culture of legalism that encourages 
recourse to international law and arbitration for dispute resolution (Pope Atkins 1999, 
Holsti 1996).  
 
On the domestic front, the picture is far bleaker. The continent has not only suffered 
from persistent internal violent conflict but also from the systematised violent 
oppression associated with military dictatorships. Intermittent violent conflict has 
persisted in Colombia since the start of what has come to be known as ‘La Violencia’ 
in 1948, while Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador all suffered from drawn-out, 
brutal civil wars spanning decades. An official investigation has shown that over 
200,000 lives were lost as a result of the civil war in Guatemala between 1962 and 
1996 – well over 6,000 a year on average (CEH 2000). Leftist rural guerrilla 
movements sprang up in the 1960s throughout the continent, and urban guerrilla 
groups followed in 1970s Uruguay and Argentina. Partly in response to such internal 
uprisings, during the 1970s and 80s, the South American dictatorships killed, 
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kidnapped, tortured, beat, and ‘disappeared’ thousands of ordinary citizens. To give 
just one example, nearly 10,000 people are on the official list of ‘disappeared’ from 
the Argentine Dirty War of 1976-83 (CONADEP). 
 
‘Domestic’ conflicts have not been free of external intervention, particularly in 
Central America. Holsti (1996) calculates that while 71% of Central American wars 
between 1945 and 1995 were internal, 60% of those suffered from some form of 
external intervention – occasionally direct U.S. invasion but more commonly financial 
support for one side or another, and often pressure on governments to respond in a 
certain way to insurrection. Trans-national issues such as drug prevention policies 
have caused external actors to adopt a more proactive stance and seek to exert even 
greater influence over domestic issues. For example, the U.S. government equips the 
Colombian army in its struggle against the FARC but in return demands a certain set 
of anti-drug policies including highly unpopular crop eradication policies that have 
further undermined the authority of the government in some areas. 
 
To the present day, civil war continues in Colombia, the Zapatista National Liberation 
Army (EZLN) is theoretically still in open rebellion against the Mexican Government 
in Chiapas (although there have been no direct clashes for several years), and there 
have been signs of a worrying resurgence of Sendero Luminoso in Peru. Moreover, 
recent violence and the presence of armed groups in Haiti, both earlier in 2004 and in 
recent days, demonstrate once again the potential for violent conflict to emerge at any 
moment. 
 
Nevertheless, the Central American peace accords of the 1990s, the discrediting and 
disbanding of the vast majority of guerrilla movements continent-wide, and the 
sustained transitions to democracy experienced over the past two decades have 
marked a significant change in regional conflict patterns. The gradual consolidation of 
democracy in the region has also brought significant reductions in state repression and 
has opened channels for non-violent communication and protest, although human 
rights violations continue to result from attempts to deal with illicit forms of protest
2 
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and with persistently high rates of crime – particularly organised crime. While 
conflict continues to plague Latin American societies, its manifestations now tend to 
take at least nominally non-violent forms, including blockades, marches, occupations, 
sit-ins and strident banging of pots and pans, although always with the potential to 
spill over into violence.  
 
Political instability persists, however, and the region has experienced a series of coup 
attempts (Peru – 1992, Guatemala – 1993, Venezuela – 1992, 2002) and a rash of 
presidential resignations (Peru, Argentina, Ecuador – 2001; Bolivia – 2003; Haiti – 
2004), in many cases as a result of popular protest – a method recently dubbed the 
‘civil society coup’. 
 
This paper first looks at common causes of organised violent conflict in Latin 
America, paying particular attention to the role of inequality and the transition from 
discontent to violence. It also considers the potential costs of such conflict. It then 
examines the potential contribution of dialogue to conflict prevention and resolution. 
Dialogue is an approach that has recently been promoted widely in the region, 
primarily because its methodology offers the opportunity to address political 
inequality while at the same time dealing with other key issues. The final section uses 
this framework to examine the three cases of Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela, 
providing analysis of the nature and causes of current conflicts,
3 and of the impact of 
dialogue as a conflict resolution tool. 
 
Causes and Consequences of Conflict in Latin America – the Role of Inequality 
While acknowledging a range of causes of conflict, this section focuses on a 
conceptualisation of the emergence of conflict that depends firstly on the existence of 
root causes of discontent in the form of perceived or real political, economic and 
social inequalities or injustices. These inequalities constitute raw material for conflict 
but depend on other factors for conflict to come to fruition. Such factors include the 
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mechanisms or circumstances that build awareness of such inequalities and a sense of 
collective grievance – primarily a sense of group identity. They also respond to the 
weight of history in the sense that past conflict precipitates future conflict. In addition, 
the lack of a mechanism for addressing the perceived problem, or alternative outlet for 
the anger and frustration generated by awareness of inequality, builds the social 
pressure required for subsequent explosion. Actual triggers for conflict can take the 
form both of ‘last-straw’ offending actions and of emerging ‘opportunities’ to 
respond. Thereafter, the longevity of conflictive activity and its future consequences 
depends on the responses it receives – particularly from the state but also from other 
elements of society. 
 
Root Causes of Discontent: Inequality 
There has long been an argument that one of the most important sources of civil war 
is a high degree of inequality of wealth and income.
4 Recent literature generally 
agrees that inequality is a strong predictor of conflict. In 1996, for example, Alesina 
and Perotti correlated inequality with a greater incidence of political instability 
measured by indicators such as the number of political murders annually, while 
Nafziger and Auvinen’s (1997) regression analysis of humanitarian emergencies 
indicates that high income inequality (measured by a Gini coefficient) is associated 
with political conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies.
 5 However, Cramer 
(2003) shows that there is no clear direct link between civil conflict and inequality by 
comparing conflict and non-conflict countries with similar inequality indicators, while 
Collier and Hoeffler (1996, 1998), using two versions of a model, concluded first that 
inequality significantly reduced the risk of civil war and then that it was insignificant. 
There are also dissentions over the types of inequality that have most influence. 
Bingswanger et al. (1995), for instance, look at examples of principally rural violent 
conflict to support the claim that land inequality entails social costs including unrest 
and civil war, while Muller and Seligson (1987) argue that national income 
distribution is a strong predictor of political violence even where land distribution is 
relatively equal (in Cramer 2003). 
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While early approaches have looked primarily at income inequality, more recent 
thinking has expanded the economic approach to incorporate unemployment 
specifically, and has started to examine social and political indicators in more detail. 
Stewart (2002) considers the fundamental source of organised conflict to be 
horizontal inequality – defined as inequality between culturally defined groups,
6 as 
opposed to vertical inequality – inequality between individuals or households. Her 
approach looks at inequality in terms of political participation from the highest levels 
down to local government and including guarantees of human rights; economic assets 
such as land, human capital, communal resources, minerals, privately owned capital 
and access to credit, govt infrastructure and security; incomes and employment, again 
public, private and at various skill-levels; and the social aspects of access to, and 
quality of, education, health services, water supplies, housing, and the relevance of 
unemployment, poverty, and personal and household security. She has used this 
framework for the cases of Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti 
Burundi, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia to show evidence 
of a positive relationship between horizontal inequalities and civil conflict. 
 
Cramer (2003) also promotes the idea that it is important to consider the significance 
of varying kinds of inequality but adds that the socio-historical relationships behind 
inequality are more important than the specifics of inequality itself. In this way, inter-
group relationships (nationals-immigrants, wage workers-capitalists, peasants-
landowners, black-white) determine the social and political significance of inequality. 
He also emphasises the influence of how inequalities are managed by societies – an 
approach consistent with Schock (1996), who considers that existing political 
opportunity structures can either channel discontent through conventional forms of 
political participation or can generate violent political conflict. 
 
This expanded approach takes into account the interrelated nature of economic, 
political and social inequalities. In Latin America, political power is an effective 
instrument for control of economic power as economies have traditionally been state-
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with each other, for certain purposes, as against those outside the group, normally also identifying 
some other group with whom they are in conflict.’ Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




centred, political systems have favoured strong presidents, and both political power 
and economic wealth are centred in the hands of a small elite. Similarly, centuries of 
discrimination in most countries have contributed to ensuring that social privileges 
equate closely to political and economic power – in many Latin American countries a 
handful of families still predominate socially, politically, and in terms of accumulated 
wealth.  
 
Inequality and Latin America  
‘Latin America has some of the highest levels of economic, social and political 
inequality in the world…arising mostly from political connections, inherited wealth 
and power, and discriminatory acts against specific population groups.’ (Justino et al. 
2003, p.2) If inequality is considered to play a key role in engendering social and 
political discontent, and ultimately violent conflict, throughout the continent, it is 
important to take a look at the major characteristics of Latin American Latin 
American economic, social and political inequality. 
 
Economic inequalities: 
Latin American income inequality is the highest in the world. The region has had a 
Gini income coefficient of over 0.5 since the 1960s, as compared with 0.45 in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 0.37 in OECD countries and a mere 0.3 for South Asia. Both Bolivia 
and Brazil have coefficients of close to 0.6 – among the highest in world. With the 
exception of Costa Rica and Honduras, income inequality increased between the early 
1980s and late 1990s, despite a gradual reduction in poverty rates over the 1990s to a 
current average of 33% (Justino et al. 2003). 
 
People at the bottom of economic, social, and political distributions of assets and 
rights in developing countries tend to concentrate in rural areas. Land is important for 
both their economic survival and prospects of social mobility, particularly as it relates 
closely to access to credit. Most Latin American countries show acutely unequal 
distribution of land in terms of both size and quality. The Gini Land Concentration 
Index shows rates as high as 0.86 for Argentina and 0.91 for Venezuela in the 1980s, 
as compared with 0.75 in the US and 0.58 in France (Rodríguez & Smith 1994, IFAD 
2001, Justino et al. 2003).  Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




Rising unemployment and increasing numbers employed in the informal sector in 
Latin America are also concerns in terms of persistent inequality. Of new jobs created 
in the region since 1990, seven in ten have been in the informal sector and only four 
in ten come with social security benefits (Jubany & Meltzer 2004). On average, 
workers in the informal sector earn 44% less than those in the formal sector (ILO 
2001). Such disparities of opportunity perpetuate economic inequality and generate a 
sense of collective grievance among the disadvantaged. 
Social inequalities: 
Social inequalities are particularly acute in Latin America. While most countries in 
the region have universal primary education, basic health care, and social service 
systems that reached most of the poor by the 1990s, two-tier systems often mean that 
better-off groups benefit from far higher quality private hospitals, schools and 
insurance (Justino et al. 2003). 
 
Health care is vital in terms of human development not only for the improvements it 
provides in nutrition, decreased mortality rates, and increased availability of human 
capital, but also because it has been shown to increase the chances of individuals 
accessing better jobs and consequently higher wages (Justino et al. 2003). The 
starkest discrepancies in health care are between urban and rural areas. On average, 
between 1990 and 1997, 81% of urban areas and just 52% of rural areas in the region 
benefited from adequate sanitation.
7 In 1995, 90% of urban areas and only 49% of 
rural areas had safe drinking water, and between 1985 and 1995, public health 
services were available in 84% of urban areas and 54% of rural areas (IFAD 2001). 
Moreover, Latin America suffers from a hospital sector characterised by high costs 
and little regulation, and from disproportionate spending on specialist curative rather 
than preventative measures (DFID 2001).  
 
The average number of years spent in education in Latin America was 6.17 in 1995, 
up from just 3.06 in 1960 (Justino et al. 2003). Education inequality is lower in Latin 
America than most other developing regions but is almost twice that of OECD 
countries and Eastern Europe (UNDP 2004). Most countries have universal primary 
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education but the quality is often significantly worse in schools attended by the poor, 
and very few governments have invested in secondary education. While the rich finish 
university, the poor tend to drop out after completing the primary stage (Londoño 
1996). The second richest 10% in Latin America has on average three fewer years of 
education than the top 10%, while the bottom 30% have almost 7 years less (IADB 
1999). Moreover, illiteracy is much higher in rural areas and among women, although 
there have been major improvements over the past four decades. Inequality in 
education is also reflected in inequalities in both labour participation and earnings, 
especially for women (Justino et al. 2003, IADB 1999). 
 
Most Latin American countries have basic social insurance and social assistance 
programmes but coverage varies substantially and in most cases higher strata benefit 
from better systems than (mostly uninsured) lower income groups (Justino et al. 
2003). Also, powerful pressure groups receive social protection, more coverage, lower 
costs for themselves and more generous benefits (Mesa-Lago 1983) There have been 
some positive changes – in 1981 Chile introduced a privately managed and funded 
defined-contribution system controlled by the government that has recently been 
adopted by Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay and Mexico. These systems have not 
yet met their redistributive objectives but still constitute a major improvement on 
previous systems (CIID 1999).  
 
Political inequalities 
According to Gacitúa and Sojo (2000), the clientelism and corruption that are 
prevalent in much of Latin American have excluded large sectors of the poor from 
involvement in political life, resulting in overrepresentation of the non-poor, and 
alliances between non-poor and poor that disempower the latter. Predominantly white, 
male, university educated, urban, and propertied non-poor not only dominate state 
apparatus, legal system and parties but also have informal social power as 
landowners, bankers, employers, media voices, academics and patrons. Their beliefs 
about the status quo, their place within it, and the debts they owe to each other make 
for a durable and flexible system of elite domination and perpetuation. When 
democratization or political movements demanding redistribution threaten these 
assumptions, the non-poor close ranks, making the underlying realities even more Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




visible (Gacitúa & Sojo 2000, Justino et al. 2003). The centralised systems of 
government favoured by Latin American countries also help to perpetuate the rule of 
a few key families or figures. In addition, Latin American public legal systems, 
systems of protection of property and prisons, among others, seem to benefit citizens 
largely in proportion to their levels of wealth or investment (Benabou 2000, Genn 
1999). In 2000, over half of the Latin American prison population had not been tried 
(UNDP 2004). The poor also fail to bring up legal grievances when the law would 
permit them to do so (Genn 1999).  
 
Group inequality and indigenous populations 
Finally, for all of these forms of inequality, it is important to point out significant 
disparities that negatively affect minority ethnic groups. Race and ethnicity correlate 
closely with inequality in Latin America. For example, 88% of the Bolivian and 93% 
of the Guatemalan indigenous populations fall below the poverty line (Justino et al. 
2003). This discrimination is reflected in social indicators such as literacy rates, 
school attendance, malnutrition, infant mortality and access to services, all of which 
are worse for indigenous populations (World Bank 1993). In 1995 for example, the 
predominantly indigenous Mexican states of Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca had 
poverty levels twice the national average (World Bank 1995). 
 
Awareness of Inequalities – Emergence of Group Identities  
The emergence or development of group identities is a key factor in generating 
awareness of existing inequalities, as well as in turning into action the discontent that 
awareness can generate. Identification with a given group brings a sense of collective 
history, of shared ideology and combined strength that can combat individual feelings 
of insignificance. It also brings awareness of one’s own position and treatment 
relative to other groups – a far more powerful driver than individual comparisons. 
 
The role of leadership is clearly essential in terms of group dynamics – in this case 
both for pulling groups together and for moving groups from discontent to protest. 
There are many examples of inspired symbolic leadership in Latin America having a 
powerful influence not just on the way a group presents itself to the public but also on 
the way the public perceives that group, and at the head of many key social Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




movements can be found charismatic figures such as EZLN commander 
Subcomandante Marcos in Chiapas, Mexico, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo 
Morales in Bolivia. 
 
Some theorists (known as ‘instrumentalists’) hold that group identity is ‘constructed’ 
by political leaders who see group cohesion and mobilisation as helpful in their 
competition for power and resources. In order to do so they rework historical 
memories to engender group identity. While there is some evidence of leadership 
manipulating group identity (the recent referendum campaign in Venezuela provides 
abundant examples), this approach is inconsistent with the fact that the leadership of 
many Latin American social groups has emerged naturally from within and many 
leaders continue to live within their communities rather than make the transition to the 
echelons of power. It is hard to conceive of Argentina’s piquetero (picketers) 
movement of unemployed protestors, for example, as a creation designed purely to 
bring its leaders power. 
 
Moreover, whatever the surrounding manipulations, group identity still depends on 
having a set of shared circumstances including elements such as language, cultural 
traditions, location or similar sources of hardship/exploitation, as well as, ideally, 
historical identification with the same group (Stewart 1998). Indeed, as Turton (1997 
in Stewart 2002) points out, the effectiveness of ethnicity as a means of advancing 
group interests depends on it being seen as a cultural given by those who make claims 
in its name. This suggests that efforts to address conflict should respect the strength of 
group identity as conceived of by those involved, even while addressing the fact that 
manipulation and/or misperceptions may colour the form that such sense of identity 
takes. 
  
Class and ideology 
Within Latin America, the major group identities associated with armed conflict have 
traditionally been class-related, although with a strongly linked indigenous element in 
some cases. This is a natural result of the persistent inequalities described above in 
combination with entrenched hierarchical patterns of government, development and 
social interaction dating back to colonial times. The classic class representatives, trade Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




unions, have consistently played a key role in Latin American politics. In some cases, 
however, corporatist and clientelist behaviour ensured the co-opting and incorporation 
of organised labour into the state (as was the case in 1960s Venezuela, for example) 
and it has more recently been the role of those excluded even from this form of 
representation to rise up and challenge the status quo. The recent growth of the 
informal sector and persistently high unemployment rates have also undermined the 
trade union movements. 
 
Closely related to class-based identities is the historical prevalence of leftwing, class-
dominated ideology in the region. The various guerrilla movements of the 1960s and 
‘70s in South America were heavily influenced by the ideology of class struggle, as 
were the rebels of Central America’s civil wars. Although the FARC in Colombia has 
diverged considerably from its leftist ideological roots, Sendero Luminoso in Peru 
continues to maintain an overtly Maoist ideology based on the revolutionary power of 
the peasant. 
 
In the past, Communism provided a practical source of income (and hence group 
unity) for many of these groups as Cuba, backed by the USSR, rushed to support 
guerrilla movements in countries such as Guatemala, Venezuela, and, later, Bolivia. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War deprived both left- and 
rightwing Latin American movements of valuable sources of income as Cuba began 
to look inwards while the U.S. no longer felt compelled to invest so heavily in support 
to anti-communist movements. 
 
More general populist ideology has consistently been used to cement group identity 
and generate popular support. From Peron’s descamisados or blue-collar workers in 
Argentina through to Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolutionaries in Venezuela, leaders have 
consistently sought to present new ideological visions, with varying degrees of 
consistency and follow-through. 
 
Indigenous identity 
Indigenous movements have become steadily more vocal in Latin America over the 
past few decades, raising a variety of demands on behalf of indigenous populations. Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




Taking advantage of the opportunities to organise provided by democratic 
liberalization and galvanised into action by the effects of neoliberal reforms, they 
have successfully made the transition from community-level traditional organisation 
to developing regional and national support networks and organisations, bringing 
together different indigenous groups under the same umbrellas for the first time 
(Yashar 1999). Moreover, the emphasis is no longer on the distinction between 
ethnicity and class but instead on the natural linkages between them, as indigenous 
movements connect economic issues such as indigenous land rights directly with 
cultural survival (NACLA 1996). Finally, the gradual extension of the education 
network, as well as the introduction of teaching in indigenous languages has led to a 
higher level of education among the indigenous population that has, in turn, helped 
them to organise and convey their grievances. As a result, many Latin American 
states have been forced to consider the issue of indigenous citizenship rights, as well 
as take measures to combat the effects of centuries of persistent discrimination that 
have left the vast majority of indigenous people in conditions of abject poverty and 
with restricted access to social and political benefits.  
 
To date, however, Latin America indigenous movements have focused on increased 
indigenous cultural, social and political rights and representation, rather than 
separatism. Even the armed Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico has not demanded 
an indigenous nation. Many of the demands of indigenous groups correlate closely 
with the more generalised demands of the poor. Bolivia, for example, provides a clear 
example of indigenous groups adopting the demands of other non-indigenous groups 
that relate to inequality and discrimination, building a connection that depends more 
on socio-economic status than on ethnicity. 
 
From Discontent to Conflict 
Cultural differences alone are not sufficient to bring about group mobilisation that 
turns violent. Instead, groups clash over the distribution and exercise of power, 
whether economic, political or both. The fact that conflict depends on group identity 
as defined against another group renders relative position more important than 
absolute, although absolute deterioration may force attention onto the relative Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




situation – by, for example, making certain resources scarce (Cohen 1974, Stewart 
2002). 
 
Political inequality is a contributor to conflict primarily because it determines the way 
in which discontent is expressed. In most cases, illicit protest is selected only as a last 
resort, and the same is even truer of violence. If group identity and group concerns 
can be expressed through democratic or institutional channels, there is no need for 
protest to spill over. As long as the group feels its needs and interests are taken in to 
consideration, or at least has the hope that they will be in future, there is less 
resentment and a reduced need for the group to make its voice heard in other ways. 
Where violence has erupted in Latin America, and indeed where protestors have hit 
the streets, it has often been because these channels were not available or not 
functioning – usually because politics and institutions have been dominated by small 
elites uninterested in the needs of the rest of the country and because clientelist 
interactions have included some groups but excluded others on a relatively arbitrary 
basis.  
 
‘Last straw’ offending actions and emerging ‘opportunities’  
Given such circumstances steeped in a variety of inequalities, a number of potential 
triggers can ignite or exacerbate conflict, primarily by generating absolute increases in 
inequality or by highlighting relative differences (Stewart 1998): 
 
Endogenous Changes include growing demographic pressures, environmental 
changes resulting in scarcities (e.g. of water), and the success or failure of a 
development model changing absolute and relative access to employment and 
incomes. 
 
Policy Changes that can generate instability include institutional and legal changes 
over issues such as property rights or water regulations and stabilisation measures 
such as devaluations and price regulations. The middle and lower-class residents of 
Cochabamba in Bolivia blockaded the streets in protest against the privatisation of the 
water supply and subsequent price hike in 2000, eventually forcing the Government to 
reverse its decision. Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  





Political Changes would include changes in the distribution of state benefits for 
political reasons (Stewart 2002). Ideology can also play a role as previously accepted 
injustices come to be regarded as grounds for conflict (Hampshire 2000). This is 
perhaps the case in Venezuela, where President Chávez called into question a political 
arrangement that had broadly been considered legitimate for several decades 
previously. 
 
External Developments such as changes in market access, debt and interest payments, 
and capital flows (including aid) can also have a destabilising effect (Stewart 1998). 
Argentina’s political crisis of December 2001, for example, was precipitated by 
economic collapse brought on by external shocks. As Justino (2002) points out, 
institutional changes and market uncertainties resulting from industrialisation, 
urbanisation and modernisation in most developing countries have made some people 
better off and others worse off. Sectors of the population have been unable to 
participate in these changes due to lack of access, lack of education or deliberate 
discrimination. In addition, the liberalisation process entails increased uncertainty, 
especially in traditional markets. 
 
External political pressure can also play its part. In Bolivia, support for Morales’s 
Presidential campaign of 2002 increased dramatically when the U.S. Ambassador 
threatened to cut aid to Bolivia if the population voted Morales in. More positive 
external changes can also have a destabilising effect in that they open up new 
possibilities for equality and increase expectations. Examples include the departure of 
dictators and waves of external pressure for democratisation (Cramer 2003). 
 
Finally, in classic violent conflict analysis, a key factor in determining whether 
discontent will spill over into violence is opportunities in terms of access to arms, 
soldiers, food, etc. (Solimano 2004). This applies somewhat less to political unrest but 
some elements still hold, such as the fact that higher unemployment rates mean more 
people are available to protest during the working day at no additional personal cost.  
 Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




Impact of Responses  
The impact of state responses is complex and somewhat unpredictable. Even tried-
and-tested policies can provoke unexpected negative responses in a conflict setting. 
On the one hand, inappropriate state handling of protests or crises can fuel grievances, 
as was clear in Bolivia in February and October 2003 when deaths caused by police 
clashes with protesters brought even the middle-classes onto the protest scene. On the 
other hand, the Bolivian case has also shown how weak conciliatory government 
responses can set a precedent for illicit forms of protest as a way to get demands met, 
bypassing formal institutions and weakening the rule of law. Argentina’s piquetero 
organisations are open about the fact that they continue to block the streets because 
they get more social benefits in return (Young, Guagnini & Amato 2002). One school 
of thought on the Colombian conflict holds that President Pastrana’s conciliatory 
advances served not only to perpetuate the conflict but also gave the FARC time to 
regroup. Another approach, however, is concerned not only about the human rights 
implications and human costs of harsher military responses but also sees the potential 
for state-sponsored repression to undermine government legitimacy and aid rebel 
recruitment campaigns. 
 
The appeasement or success of one group in achieving its aims can also generate 
problems with other groups – who may either feel aggrieved by the result of the 
agreement or who learn the lesson that protest is an effective mechanism for 
achieving certain demands – the perennial rock and hard place scenario. If President 
Mesa nationalises the gas industry in Bolivia as a result of indigenous protest, he may 
well find that the social and business movements of the east make good on their 
promise to rise up against him in return. 
 
It is not only the state that can engender conflict with its responses. Sectors of middle 
and upper class Venezuela have responded antagonistically to recent popular 
challenges by forming themselves into armed neighbourhood vigilante groups. The 
result has been the crystallisation of two distinct and opposing identities that clash 
frequently. 
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Consequences of Conflict 
Conflict, by its very nature and by the damage it causes, contributes to the 
perpetuation of poverty and socio-economic inequalities, as well as feeding back into 
rising poverty and unemployment and deteriorating living conditions, thereby 
increasing discontent and generating further conflict (PRUS 2002). 
 
The cost of conflict to society is manifold. There are obvious human and social costs 
– deaths and injuries, displaced populations and destroyed livelihoods – usually most 
acute among heads of household and working-age members of households (Stewart & 
Fitzgerald 2001). More subtly, the psychological trauma associated with both conflict 
and post-conflict readjustment leads to more pervasive social violence (e.g. domestic 
abuse) and criminality. 
 
Then there are the economic costs – first in terms of absolute damage to property, loss 
of human capital and lost opportunities for development, and second in terms of lost 
investment as the insecurity and increased risk associated with conflict, including the 
risk of property destruction, adversely affect both foreign and domestic investment 
(Alesina and Perotti 1996). Moreover, lower private investment levels and the costs 
(military, police, property repairs, etc) of dealing with conflict also increase the 
financial burden on the state and reduce the resources available for social policies. 
Justino (2001) shows that on average military expenditure as a percentage of total 
government expenditure rises in countries suffering from periods of civil war, while 
health and education expenditure tend to fall. In El Salvador, for example, military 
expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure rose from 12% in 1979 
to 40.8% in 1991, while education expenditure fell from 19.8% to 12.8%, and health 
expenditure fell from 9% to 7.3% over the same period (PRUS 2002).  
 
 
Tackling Conflict in Latin America 
 
Conflict is not only inevitable but can also be a positive driver for creative change 
provided it is channelled appropriately. As a result, it is the effort to provide 
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the heart of all forms of conflict prevention and resolution. While successful conflict 
resolution responds to developing or existing conflicts by helping those involved find 
ways to transform destructive cycles into positive steps forward, successful conflict 
prevention staves off violence by encouraging people not to get caught in those 
dynamics in the first place. 
 
Both conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the Latin American context need to 
focus on ensuring that much needed change can take place in an environment of peace 
and stability conducive to improved human development, and that it is based on 
consensus rather than imposed by one side on the other – be that by dominant elites 
wielding their political and economic power or by protesters holding the country 
hostage with blockades, marches, riots and worse. In this sense, conflict prevention 
and resolution are not only about averting danger or repairing damage, but also about 
finding and capitalising on the inherent opportunity to move forward and reduce the 
potential for conflict in the future. 
 
Conflict resolution effectively falls within the sphere of conflict prevention. To have 
any lasting success and sustainability, efforts to resolve conflict need to incorporate 
mechanisms that deal with the causes of conflict, otherwise it is a little like a dentist 
giving pain killers for tooth decay without filling the tooth – the pain may be 
temporarily alleviated but the patient will be back in the chair in agony once more the 
following morning. Indeed, in long-term ongoing conflict situations, the only way out 
is to address causes, as initial triggers have long since lost their influence.  
 
As outlined above, Latin America has recently suffered from increasing political 
instability. While that instability is clearly generated in part by social and economic 
inequality, overt conflict prevention and resolution efforts have tended to address 
political inequality, primarily in the form of exclusion from decision-making 
processes. Even efforts to address root causes, such as poverty, now make efforts to 
incorporate elements of political inclusion. 
 
There are three main reasons for this focus. Firstly, political inequalities are seen as 
generators of other forms of inequality. Not only are political exclusivity and elite Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




manipulation often behind other social and economic inequalities but the failure to 
address them effectively also reflects the negative impact of unequal access to 
political power. Secondly, mechanisms used primarily to address political inequality 
can provide a framework for approaches to other controversial and conflict-producing 
issues including those related to social and economic inequality. The reduction of 
group inequalities depends on establishing and promoting participatory and inclusive 
institutions and mechanisms because such efforts offer the disadvantaged an 
alternative to violence for expressing their needs and interests, a say in their own 
futures and a sense of ownership of future visions and policies that boosts their 
commitment to making those policies successful. In doing so, they reduce the 
probability of future instability and violent conflict. Finally, the positive impact of 
visible efforts at inclusion helps to open up the space (and time) for longer-term 
initiatives addressing structural problems to take effect because, in the short term, the 
effort to improve the situation can alleviate anger and frustration generated by the 
impression that a group’s problems are overlooked. 
 
Precursors to Dialogue – Internationally Led Negotiations 
The classic conflict resolution response to an urgent crisis or outbreak of violence, as 
well as to persistent violent conflict, is the initiation of peace-talks – usually in the 
form of negotiations of some sort. In these cases, it is common for international actors 
– organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or Organisation of American States 
(OAS), government representatives from other countries, or international 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as The Carter Center – to step up and 
offer their services. This commonly takes the form of facilitation or mediation, as well 
as technical support, firstly as most domestic actors tend to be too embroiled in the 
conflict to act as impartial facilitators, and secondly because the weight of 
international attention can be an important influence in bringing reluctant actors to the 
table and encouraging genuine efforts to reach some form of agreement. In Haiti, for 
example, efforts to promote a negotiated solution were made at different times by 
U.S. President Clinton (12/2000), a local group called Civil Society Initiative 
(01/2001), a joint CARICOM-OAS mission (05/2001), and OAS Secretary General 
Gaviria and Assistant Secretary General Einaudi (2001-2004). Toward the end, the 
OAS even asked the UN to consider providing peacekeeping forces.  Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  





A persistent problem with the involvement of other countries, however, is the fact that 
they inevitably have their own agendas. In the Colombian case, for example, the 
facilitating Commission for negotiations between guerrilla groups and the 
Government includes a number of European countries – Spain, France, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland – plus Venezuela, Canada, Mexico and Cuba.
8 This 
arrangement suits the Colombian government in terms of the support and attention it 
provides, but not in the sense that it allows external interference in supposedly 
“domestic” affairs. 
 
The Haitian case also shows how inconsistent messages from different international 
actors can actually have a negative effect on efforts to reach an agreement. In early 
2004, while CARICOM member states promoted a plan that required Aristide to 
legalise protests, release detainees, reform the police, disarm the population, and hold 
internationally monitored elections at the end of his term, a French statement gave the 
impression that they would be prepared to back a power-sharing agreement that 
excluded Aristide, strengthening the unarmed opposition’s resolve to hold out for 
Aristide’s resignation on the principle that it would not bring international 
repercussions (Carter Center 2004). 
 
Internationally brokered and supported peace negotiations have clearly been essential 
elements of both conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the past and will no 
doubt continue to be so in future. Their top-down, hierarchical approach, however, 
means that they are not always able to respond effectively to the recent changes in 
conflict patterns in Latin America that have brought newly empowered, but otherwise 
poorly represented, civil society groups out onto the streets to voice their demands. It 
is partly in response to this shift that the dialogue processes outlined below have 
emerged. The shift also reflects widespread recognition that the complex process of 
institution building is best done through the leadership of national actors and that the 
international community has only a limited role to play in this area. 
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First and foremost, dialogue has a role to play in seeking democratic solutions to 
crises and consolidating fragile democratic processes. Most usage in Latin America 
has involved government-initiated dialogue simultaneously as a short-term measure to 
respond to the immediate pressures of a political, economic and/or social crisis, and as 
a longer-term measure designed to promote government legitimacy and to build 
consensus on key policies and issues. In Argentina, for example, the 2002 National 
Dialogue produced both basic agreements to cope with the emergency situation and 
general consensus on key public policies. Despite its orientation toward public and 
development policies, it is clear that the process was launched by the Argentine 
Government to cope with an emergency situation that was threatening to move 
beyond its control, in a context in which civil society was determined to express itself 
one way or another and alternatives such as repression had already proven ineffective. 
In such a case, dialogue offers immediate signs of responsive activity on the part of 
the government, which have a calming effect on the situation and help to appease a 
range of distinct protesting groups. It allows the government to retain control over the 
situation by showing existing political institutions to be adaptable to changing needs 
and requirements – thereby strengthening rather than weakening them. It also supports 
alternatives to violence for expression of group interests and needs, while the multi-
stakeholder approach helps to ensure that a wide range of perspectives is taken into 
account and social groups feel a sense of ownership for the outcomes of the dialogue. 
Where protest is driven at least in part by the lack of alternative communication 
channels, such opportunities for expression can be invaluable short-term deterrents to 
violence. Longer-term, however, institutional channels and opportunities need to 
replace one-off or impromptu opportunities. In Bolivia, national dialogue has been 
enshrined in law and it is required of the government to convoke such a dialogue 
every three years. In other places, formal institutions have come to fulfil the same 
requirements.  
  
                                                 
9 This section draws on International IDEA 2004, UNDP 2003 and Saunders 1999. A more detailed 
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Participatory dialogue has also been used as a development tool – both for preparation 
of national development strategies and strategic visions and to help generate new 
policies and programmes on specific human development issues (e.g. Bolivia – 1997, 
2000, Visión Guatemala – 1997). By giving citizens a greater stake in formulating 
national strategy, these methodologies seek to reinforce democratic institutions and 
support a more participative, cooperative, and democratically inclusive culture. 
Citizens with a sense of ownership of the process and its outcome agreements also 
have more inclination to follow-through and support subsequent processes and 
policies. For more specific policies, the creative nature of the dialogue process, plus 
the fact that it incorporates a range of stakeholders, means that dialogue provides 
decision-makers with a fuller array of policy choices. However, the label ‘dialogue’ 
should not merely be a tool to legitimise government (or indeed international 
organisations’) choices and priorities but instead should involve all elements of 
society and should address the fundamental political implications of specific issues 
and choices.  
 
Definitions of Dialogue 
The UNDP defines democratic dialogue as a ‘cross-institutional, multi-stakeholder 
process that addresses complex social problems not being adequately addressed by 
existing institutions.  The dialogue is open and inclusive, encouraging participants to 
talk with and listen to one another in an effort to build trust, enable consensus, and 
produce concrete results.  Dialogue is democratic when it promotes broad inclusion 
and participation, and when it emphasises the promotion of democracy and 
democratic development’ (UNDP 2005).  While there are a host of other definitions 
for dialogue available, this particular definition captures the principles that make 
dialogue an apt tool for conflict resolution, and indeed conflict prevention, both in 
Latin America and further afield. 
 
The value of dialogue lies in the balance it seeks between relationship-building and 
problem-solving and the virtuous dynamic it can generate as a result. Dialogue 
processes are designed to help build the relationships required to reach sustainable 
solutions. In turn, the consensus that trust-building can generate has a positive effect 
on those same relationships, and hence (it is hoped) on relationships between key Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




social and political actors more generally. Thus, dialogue should be differentiated 
from debate, public-policy discussions and negotiations above all because it focuses 
not only on the problem at hand but also on the underlying relationships that generate 
conflict. In addition, the process helps to generate a sense of ownership of both the 
process and any resolution, while establishing rules of social interaction for dealing 
with conflict that constitute a powerful contribution to institution building. 
 
Principles of dialogue processes in theory and in practice 
Inevitably, there is a gap between the hypothetical ideal of what democratic dialogue 
should constitute and the reality of dialogue processes, in which compromise and 
improvisation are essential for overcoming blocks and problems. This section outlines 
some key principles that feed into design of the ideal dialogue process and the 
practical limitations and obstacles they come up against when applied. 
 
Participation: Dialogue processes are characterised by their approach to participation. 
Inclusion of as many stakeholders as possible, including all those considered ‘part of 
the problem,’ brings advantages of broader ownership, more varied input and 
perspectives, and legitimacy through positive perceptions of openness. It also helps to 
make agreements sustainable.  
 
Broad participation can, however, produce difficulties of dispersion and 
disadvantages for consensus building and decision-making, and for making progress 
with inter-participant relationships. In situations of high tension or polarisation, some 
dialogue processes have had to begin with the exclusion of groups that threaten to 
sabotage the process or show no real commitment and have later expanded to 
incorporate a broader range of actors. Some groups may also feel that they are making 
unacceptable concessions by sitting down together, let alone talking – the inclusion of 
‘illegal’ groups (rebels/guerrilla/freedom fighters/terrorists), for example, can be 
highly contentious but may equally be essential for moving toward resolution of a 
conflict. It may also be that logistical arrangements simply do not allow for everyone 
to participate at once. Finally, dialogue has the potential for misuse as its conveners 
can use it to be seen to be participatory without necessarily actually taking into 
account the opinions, ideas and needs expressed through the process.  Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  





There is no set rule as to who decides on participants – the decision has at times been 
made by conveners, at times by the facilitator, and at times has formed part of the 
early discussion process. In several cases, sectors and/or organisations have been 
invited to select their own representatives to fill allocated slots. One limitation of this 
approach is that selected representatives (of civil society for example) often represent 
the largest and most vocal groups, leaving smaller organisations less well represented 
– something that is difficult to avoid but can have damaging consequences for future 
acceptance of any agreement. Another fundamental problem to avoid is that of the 
deliberate exclusion of certain groups in order to be able to manipulate the discussion. 
Finally, even when invitations are inclusive, there are no guarantees that all 
organisations and individuals will agree to participate. 
 
Neutral Facilitators and Conveners: Within Latin America, international organisations 
such as UNDP and the OAS, as well as NGOs such as The Carter Center and WSP-
International, have supported national and regional dialogue processes, often 
providing facilitators and helping generate confidence in the legitimacy of the 
processes, many of which are convoked by national governments. There are 
nationally driven examples also – the Catholic Church in particular has played an 
invaluable role in dialogue promotion and facilitation. 
 
The factors that influence an organisation’s widespread acceptance as a facilitator 
depend primarily on its capacity to present itself as impartial and its perceived 
capacity to provide the service required. Although domestic facilitators have the 
advantage of being seen to have the interests of the country at heart and to understand 
the situation better, there are not always appropriate domestic actors recognised by all 
sides. The OAS, for example, benefits from the fact that it receives specific mandates 
from its member states (including the state in question) to intervene in conflict 
situations and has several decades of involvement in assisting member states to 
resolve and manage political crises. It also has access to high-level leadership from 
both governmental and non-governmental sectors. UNDP has the advantage of being 
present before, during and after conflict – a factor that generates perceptions of its 
disinterested and impartial approach, although it initially had to work to overcome its Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




image as a collaborator with governments (Russell 2000). NGOs such as The Carter 
Center and WSP-International benefit from their neutral image as non-government 
organisations with no stake in the outcome, and from the flexibility their NGO status 
generates in terms of their activities and approaches.  
 
Almost everyone is seen as biased by someone, however. In practice dialogue 
processes are commonly facilitated by whoever is acceptable (or perhaps least 
unacceptable) to both sides. The approach in Venezuela (see below), whereby the 
process was facilitated by a team comprising the OAS, UNDP and The Carter Center 
- each eliciting different popular responses, shows one innovative way around this 
difficulty. As a baseline, the facilitator needs to be perceived as impartial by most if 
not all participants, and by the public more generally, in order to encourage general 
acceptance of any results and to generate the safe space required for genuine and open 
communication. 
 
Trust Building versus Problem Solving: As mentioned above, the key distinguishing 
feature of dialogue is its emphasis on trust building and relationships in conjunction 
with the quest for consensus and results, and its capacity to consider improvements in 
communication and understanding as achievements in themselves. The reality of 
national dialogue processes, however, is that they are often driven by a need to show 
signs of progress – both to keep people animated and involved, and to demonstrate the 
validity of dialogue in a results-oriented, policy-driven world. In order to ensure that 
solutions last, enough of an emphasis must be placed on process to avoid forcing 
unsustainable agreements. The inclusive decision-making process within dialogue 
avoids subsequent rejection of solutions by excluded sectors and deters governments 
from backtracking in their post-dialogue actions. It also generates solutions with 
popular support and legitimacy borne of their origins. 
 
Long-term approach: The ideal for a dialogue process is a long-term approach that 
allows for gradual progression and for building on progress made. The reality of crisis 
situations, however, may well make that an unaffordable luxury, or there may not 
initially be enough support for the process to be designed as long-term. One approach 
would be to start with a smaller-scale process but leave space open for expansion at a Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




later stage. However, there is little point in a dialogue process if it focuses only on 
short-term troubleshooting – in that situation the pressure for resolution is such that 
the balance between consensus and solutions is skewed. 
 
Level Playing Field: Finally, the ideal for a dialogue process is a ‘level playing-field’ 
situation in which all actors feel they can safely participate and communicate their 
interests, needs and ideas. The reality, however, is that dialogues do not take place in 
a vacuum and the power relations that affect stakeholders outside the process will 
inevitably have some influence on their interaction during the process itself. Given 
this, the role of the facilitator becomes vital for redressing any imbalances, setting and 
controlling the tone and style of interaction, and encouraging the use of organisational 
structures that allow weaker voices to be heard – the use of smaller groups at a range 
of levels for example, or promotion of certain types of decision-making structure. 
 
While recognising the practical limitations of dialogue processes, the bottom line for 
each of these elements is that what makes dialogue different from other processes – 
negotiation for example – cannot be sacrificed. Dialogue is fundamentally about an 
approach to the process that focuses on communication and trust, whatever precise 
form that process may take, and it is this approach that makes dialogue successful in 
promoting participation and inclusion, and in generating sustainable solutions to 
complex problems. 
 
Dialogue is not a cure-all. It has specific advantages in situations where exclusion, 
discrimination and ensuing inequality have generated or perpetuated conflict because 
its participatory, multi-stakeholder nature addresses the underlying causes even as it 
opens up the opportunity for non-violent communication on key issues and 
grievances. Dialogue can help to deal with emotive, divisive issues bound up with 
identity, values and relationships such as environmental problems, immigration, 
housing or land reform – issues that cannot be dealt with appropriately in a rigidly 
institutional setting. For many of these issues, based on past precedent, trust is lacking 
and relationships between stakeholders tend to hostility – particularly during post-
conflict or post-crisis transitions, for example. In such cases, dialogue offers the time Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




and space to restructure relationships in a relatively safe environment in which 
improved relationships are considered a valuable result.  
 
Why is dialogue so widespread in Latin America? 
Although it impossible to give a categorical explanation for the burgeoning popularity 
of dialogue in Latin America, there are a number of factors that can at least give clues. 
Firstly, early examples of dialogue in the region clearly demonstrated its potential 
contribution to conflict prevention and resolution. In Panama, the Bambito dialogue 
processes were initiated in response to the collapse of the Noriega regime, the U.S. 
invasion, and growing social and political polarisation. In this context, women’s 
movements and the Catholic Church came together to promote social and political 
dialogue in November 1992. The United Nations through UNDP then promoted the 
idea of a dialogue process in support for human development and to help map out the 
future of the country. The Bambito dialogues that ensued have increased citizen 
confidence in democratic institutions, strengthened collective identity, improved the 
relationship between politics and civil society, and convinced Panamanian elites of 
the value of dialogue (Castillo 2002). In Guatemala, meanwhile, in the face of an 
attempt at a ‘self-coup’ by President Serrano in 1993, civil society organisations from 
across the political spectrum formed a National Consensus Forum (Instancia Nacional 
de Consenso) to oppose the coup and with the intention of offering a valid and 
reasonable alternative vision for the future. Resisting subsequent efforts to sideline 
them once more, they then secured their involvement in the renewed peace 
negotiations in 1994 through a Civil Society Assembly (ASC) mandated to discuss the 
substantive issues addressed in the bilateral negotiations and to formulate consensus 
positions, although these would not be binding on the negotiators. The ASC proved 
unexpectedly successful at developing consensus documents on what Alvarez 
describes as: ‘some of the most challenging issues in Guatemala’s history under 
pressure from a tight deadline of December 1994.’ (2002 p.6) Many ASC proposals 
were subsequently incorporated into the Peace Accords. 
 
Another explanation for the enthusiasm for dialogue in Latin America can be found in 
the actions of key international actors, who helped to build on these foundations by 
promoting the sharing of examples. The two primary examples are the UNDP and the Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




OAS, both of whom have formally promoted dialogue processes, and related 
networking and sharing of experiences. In addition to UNDP internal sharing of 
lessons learned, the Programme has been working with a number of partners to 
promote a Community of Practice for organisations and individuals working on 
Democratic Dialogue. There have now been two international meetings for 
organisations promoting dialogue, and three for expert practitioners. The Community 
of Practice has developed a mission statement that incorporates creating a space to 
share knowledge and experiences, and extract lessons learned to improve dialogue 
interventions, coordinating institutional efforts for dialogue promotion, enhancing 
local and national capacities for democratic development and understanding the 
conditions for using democratic dialogue and its relationship with other conflict 
resolution and democratic development tools.
10 
 
The OAS, meanwhile, has initiated a Special Program for the Promotion of Dialogue 
and Conflict Resolution (part of the organisation’s Unit for the Promotion of 
Democracy) to contribute to discussion and analysis on dialogue, conflict prevention 
and resolution in order to develop more ‘strategic, culturally sensitive and 
contextually sound approaches.’ (Murdock 2004) These efforts contribute, in turn, to 
the Special Program’s ultimate aim of strengthening the capacity of governments and 
civil society organizations to design, implement and institutionalise their own 
dialogue, conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, as the Program makes 
conceptual frameworks, methodologies, and techniques available to member states. 
This is clearly an important step toward promoting interest in dialogue and ensuring 
the long-term sustainability of dialogue processes and their conversion into 
domestically driven initiatives. 
 
The nature of Latin American political and social instability also renders dialogue an 
appropriate tool for addressing it. Many Latin American countries now have a range 
of protesting groups rather than one or two all-encompassing opposition movements, 
which makes traditional negotiation all but impossible.
11 In addition, Latin American 
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organised civil society has generally been well developed enough to be able to 
participate effectively and take advantage of dialogue, with many strong social 
groupings and increasingly vocal group demands for representation. In most cases 
there were also already institutions in place, although weak, that provided space for 
dialogue to take place and the potential for dialogue to function as an institution-
building tool in strengthening existing mechanisms. Finally, weak governments – 
particularly in the aftermath of dictatorships – have been compelled to embrace rather 
than resist calls for participation and dialogue under strong pressure from 
‘democratisation’ reforms and civil society groups empowered by their role in 
bringing down regional dictators.  
 
Despite its popularity in the region, dialogue is not unique to Latin America. There 
have been myriad other initiatives in the region at a range of social levels and with 
varying motivations. Latin America is, however, beginning to develop a substantial 
and systematised bank of experiences on which to build. Although the particular 
challenges and obstacles faced in any dialogue effort inevitably reflect the 
peculiarities of the given social, political, economic and cultural environment, 
valuable lessons can nevertheless be drawn from Latin American examples that will 
be applicable elsewhere, provided the circumstances and needs of a given situation 
are appropriate for dialogue. 
 
Conclusion 
One of the most powerful concepts prevalent in the conflict resolution field is the idea 
that mechanisms can in themselves contribute to vital changes and above all to the 
sustainability of those changes. This relates closely to the recent exciting changes in 
Latin America as it is beginning to embrace the concept of participation as a 
contributor to conflict prevention and resolution.  Recognition is growing of the 
importance for long-term sustainability and stability of ownership of processes, of 
mechanisms that recognise the value, validity and needs of distinct identities, and of 
attempts to address political inequalities while responding to social and economic 
needs. If this can be done in such a way as to strengthen institutions, and if it can be 
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accompanied by parallel strengthening of international capacities to anticipate and 
respond to conflict in the region, then it will provide powerful tools for responding to 
political instability and even to more serious violent conflict in future. Dialogue as a 
methodology has the potential to meet these requirements as it allows concrete 
economic and social issues to be addressed in an inclusive and participatory manner, 




To assume that all dialogue efforts achieve these broad goals of simultaneously 
reducing economic, social, and political inequality, or even set out to do so, would be 
misleading. Inevitably, reality falls short of the ideals and for all manner of reasons, 
some of which have already been considered when describing dialogue methodologies 
above. The case studies that follow provide three different examples of the use of 
some form of dialogue in conflict situations and are intended to provide illustrations 
of implementation in practice of some of the patterns and theories described above.  
 
Argentina’s national dialogue was launched in early 2002 as a direct response to a 
political and social crisis engendered primarily by economic collapse. In convening 
the dialogue, President Duhalde described its aims as to help confront the crisis, to 
find a coordinated solution for the medium- and long-term and ultimately to work on 
defining a sustainable national project. The primary achievement of the process has 
been to restore the role of dialogue for consensus building in Argentina, with 
dialogues continuing on new themes and at different levels long after the conclusion 
of the initial process. The dialogue received considerable popular support during the 
process and, in this case, dialogue proved an excellent tool for reducing tension short-
term. It is clear, however, that sustained stability will depend on the implementation 
of the newly designed policies and strategies that have emerged from the process, and 
their effectiveness above all in reducing poverty and unemployment.  
 
Bolivia has experienced two important national dialogues, both with a major focus on 
poverty reduction strategies that could also be considered to have a conflict 
prevention component. In this case, they were both launched before the climax of the Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




political crisis that led to the forced resignation of the President in October 2003, but, 
nevertheless, in a context of persistent social and political unrest that related closely to 
economic conditions. While these dialogues made valuable contributions in terms of 
promoting and even institutionalising such participatory processes, their narrow focus 
(and to some extent perceptions of lack of transparency) meant they were unable to 
have a lasting impact on social harmony in Bolivia. 
 
The supposed ‘dialogue’ described in the Venezuelan case study on closer inspection 
fails to meet the criteria laid out above for such dialogue processes. The case is 
included nevertheless because it demonstrates how difficult it can be to implement 
dialogue methodologies on the ground. In this case, the political will to become 
involved in an inclusive trust-building process, rather than a set of negotiations, was 
there neither on the part of the government nor of the opposition. Indeed the 
polarisation of the situation into government vs. opposition illustrates an 
oversimplification of positions and an entrenchment of alliances that would make 
genuine dialogue extremely difficult in any circumstance. 
 
Argentina 
In recent decades, Argentina has suffered from persistent economic problems 
including hyperinflation, currency devaluations accompanied by capital flight, 
escalating costs of living and falling real wages. These problems have been 
accompanied by political instability leading in the most extreme cases to revolts, 
overthrows and military dictatorship, without the changes in leadership and policy 
ever resolving the country’s woes.
12 
 
In 1991, President Menem set out to control inflation and generate financial stability 
by pegging the peso to the dollar at one to one parity through a currency board. The 
result was an end to rampant inflation and an inflow of billions of dollars of foreign 
investment. Long-term, however, the policy led to an overvalued peso that made 
Argentine exports uncompetitive. Moreover, Argentina’s currency board system and 
unrestricted capital mobility made it almost impossible for the economy to withstand 
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external shocks, including the US Federal Reserve raising short-term interest rates and 
the Mexican peso crisis in 1994; the Asian financial crisis of 1997; and the Russian 
and Brazilian devaluations of 1998 and 1999 respectively. 
 
Argentina entered an economic recession in 1997/8. In December 2001, the IMF shut 
off a $1.3b bailout and Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt of $141b. President De 
la Rúa also announced a $250 weekly limit on bank withdrawals to halt a run on the 
country’s banks. The middle-class joined the unemployed piqueteros in street protests 
including attacks on banks, supermarkets and the presidential palace. Twenty-seven 
people died. De la Rúa stepped down and there were three failed attempts to replace 
him before Duhalde stepped up on 1 Jan 2002. Duhalde’s first move was to create a 
multi-tiered exchange rate to replace the peso’s parity with the US dollar. This was 
particularly painful to middle-class Argentines because most salaries are paid in pesos 
while most consumer debts and mortgages are valued in US dollars.  
 
The 2001-2002 protest scene in Argentina was dominated by two groups – the 
unemployed  piqueteros  and the middle-class cacerolazos  (‘bangers of pots and 
pans’). While the middle-class have largely taken their pots and pans back to their 
kitchens in light of improving economic conditions and conciliatory gestures on the 
part of the government, the piqueteros, who have been active since 1996, have 
continued to set up their blockades and demand the attention of the rest of the country. 
The unique labels are an indication of the group identity and solidarity that gave 
individuals the strength and courage to protest. In the case of the piqueteros it also 
reflects growing organisation within the movement, although even they are fraught 
with internal divisions and the presence of rival organisations with differing 
mentalities. The fact that benefits are now channelled through piquetero organisations 
allows them to control their membership and, ironically, ensures attendance at their 
pickets. 
 
Causes of conflict 
The case of Argentina clearly illustrates how economic collapse can precipitate social 
and political crisis. Although Argentina has scored consistently over 0.8 –the UN 
threshold for ‘high human development’– since 1985 (UNDP Argentina 2002), over Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




50% of households reported a reduction in nominal incomes from October 2001 to 
2003, of which a disproportionate number were headed by individuals with secondary 
education – those who make up the Argentine ‘middle-class’. This marks a significant 
change from the economic downturns generated by the external shocks of the 1990s, 
which hit the poor hardest (Fiszbein et al. 2002). Poverty rates, having fallen 
consistently from the late 1980s into the 1990s, have been rising since 1994, reaching 
a peak in October 2002 of 57.5% below the poverty line, of which 27.5% were in 
extreme poverty – unable to meet even their basic nutritional needs. The country has 
been plagued also by rising unemployment rates, which peaked at 21% in 2002 
(INDEC, in UNDP 2004). Formal employment fell by 7.4% between October 2001 
and May 2002, the proportion of salaried workers without benefits increased from 
33% to 35% in the same period (Fiszbein et al. 2002). By 2000, the informal sector 
accounted for 38.9% of economic activity. One sector that was particularly hard hit by 
the crisis of 2001-2 was that of construction, a key source of employment for 
unskilled workers, which contracted by 42% from 2001 to 2002 (Fiszbein et al. 2002). 
 
The crisis of 2001 also provided a clear illustration of the bankruptcy of Argentine 
politics, as it proved extremely difficult to find a replacement for De la Rúa who 
would have both political backing and popular support. Just 1% of respondents to a 
Gallup poll in 2001-2002 did not think that the quality of politics and politicians 
needed to be improved in Argentina. Fortunately, around 80% believed that the 
change was possible (Fiszbein et al. 2002).  
 
Conflict Resolution – National Dialogue
13 
Already in 2001, in the face of Argentina’s growing economic and political woes, 
both UNDP and the Catholic Church had been promoting the idea of a national 
dialogue. The crisis of December 2001 effectively forced the Government’s hand and, 
as he took office in January 2002, President Duhalde called for a national dialogue to 
help to confront the crisis, to find a coordinated solution for the medium- and long-
term and, ultimately, to work on defining a sustainable national project. 
 
                                                 
13 This section draws on Dialogue case study reports found on the UNDP’s Democratic Dialogue 
website at www.democraticdialoguenetwork.org and on UNDP (2003a). Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




The National Government, the Catholic Church (under the auspices of the Argentine 
Episcopal Conference) and UNDP played a leading role in convening and 
coordinating the first phase of Diálogo Argentino, which ran from January to July 
2002. The process began with the ‘Dialogue of Actors’ – bilateral meetings held with 
diverse sectors of society to promote the concept of dialogue and identify priority 
issues and minimal agreements required.  Approximately 300 entities were 
represented by 650 leaders from the private sector (16%), NGOs (12%), professional 
and academic institutions (12%), government (12%), political parties (12%), emergent 
groups such as the piqueteros (10%), micro-businesses (6%), banks (4%), sects (4%), 
and intellectuals (2%). The aim of these meetings was to open a space for exchanging 
opinions before bringing diverse sectors together. This helped to construct an agenda 
that incorporated values.  These included immediate issues, such as the food and 
sanitary emergencies, the corralito bank freeze, the start of the school cycle/teachers’ 
salaries, and citizens arrested for demonstrating, and also strategic objectives and 
‘hinge’ themes that fell somewhere between short- and medium term. 
 
In February 2002, Sectoral Tables were established to address emergency priority 
issues and to develop consensus on public policies to be implemented in the medium-
term. This phase was accompanied by provincial dialogue processes in Catamarca, 
Corrientes, La Pampa and Buenos Aires. As a consolidation of progress made, the 
document Bases for the Argentine Dialogue was drafted in July 2002. 
 
The second phase of Diálogo Argentino (October 2002-April 2003) involved more 
extensive dialogue to identify strategic courses of action. An Enhanced Table was 
integrated with substantial civil society representation from religious ideologies, 
NGOs, corporations and workers. Its main aim was to search for basic social 
consensus to generate a governance agenda that would support social cohabitation and 
promote institutional transformation. Strategic Guidelines were subsequently adopted 
and an Operational Group was created to design and implement the actions required 
to fulfil objectives in the areas of Communication and Media, Dialogue with All, 
Advocacy in the Juncture and Governance Agenda. The Sectoral Tables were also 
made permanent. Throughout this phase, the Laymen’s Department of the Argentine Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




Episcopal Conference was responsible for coordinating the dialogue, with the 
government reducing its participation to that in the various sectoral tables. 
 
The Diálogo had the primary effects of restoring the role of dialogue as a consensus-
building instrument in Argentina; breaking down cross-sectoral tensions and 
recovering national commitment to common welfare; and developing a range of social 
reform policies. Among the specific social policy achievements of the dialogue were:  
•  The Unemployed Men and Women Heads of Households Programme now reaches 
2 million poverty-stricken homes with monthly subsidies of $150. Civil society 
organizations have been involved in implementation and monitoring at national, 
provincial and municipal levels. The programme costs the Argentine government 
around $365million a year (UNICEF). 
•  Consensus was reached at the Table on Health on prescription of generic drugs 
and on a Remedial Programme for distributing basic medicines to the neediest 
sectors. 
•  The Table on Construction and Housing produced a proposal for reactivation of 
house construction to fulfil demand for housing and reactivate employment that 
was subsequently approved and acted on by the Government. 
•  The Table for Justice Reform succeeded in integrating dynamic group of 
promoters of the reform process. 
Unfortunately, although the main authorities subscribed to the Federal Agreement on 
Political System Reform little progress was made in this area. 
 
The second phase of the dialogue included a series of public debates in April 2003 
with the presidential candidates, intended to encourage their participation in the 
construction of consensus and joint development of a Governance Agenda based on 
agreements reached during the dialogue process. 
 
Dialogue has continued since the change of government in 2003. The dialogue 
management board has been broadened to incorporate other civil society 
organisations. New thematic tables have been convened in environment, science and 
technology, and national security, and new dialogue offshoots have been launched in 
the provinces of Mendoza, Cordoba and Santa Fe. Several of Kirchner’s Ministers Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




have since praised the achievements of the dialogue and committed to work with 
dialogue methodology. The current government has also created a new Sub-secretariat 
for Institutional Reform and Democratic Strengthening. 
 
The dialogue process has, broadly speaking, received popular support. A poll of 
February 2002 suggested that it was seen as positive by around 65% of the 
population, while around 50% believed it would greatly contribute to resolution of the 
crisis (Gallup in UNDP 2003a p.6) 
 
Conclusion 
The National Dialogue offered the opportunity for the many differing and dissident 
voices in Argentina to be heard and government efforts to implement agreed policies 
and to demonstrate that it is listening have largely paid off. Efforts to increase 
economic stability and reduce unemployment have largely succeeded, as prices have 
stabilised, and poverty rates have fallen somewhat.
14 The middle-classes have 
generally returned to their homes to see how things develop over the next year or two. 
Both poverty and unemployment rates are still extraordinarily high, however, and 
groups such as the piqueteros are still defiantly active, although, ironically, they are 
relatively well controlled by what amounts to a system of benefits for good behaviour 
that in itself ensures the perpetuation of the organisations. Future stability depends 
above all on the government’s ability to walk the fine line between pleasing both 
Argentine society and the International Community (above all the IMF and World 
Bank) while also making significant changes to the political and social problems that 




As structural adjustment reforms exacerbated already worsening economic conditions 
for many in Bolivia in the 1980s and ‘90s, awareness of social inequality began to 
grow. The traditional political system began to fragment and new voices of protest 
began to be heard on the political scene and in the streets. As a culmination of this 
                                                 
14 Poverty and extreme poverty rates for the first half of 2004 stood at around 44.3% and 17% 
respectively nationwide (INDEC). Some parts of the north, however, have poverty rates well above the 
national average – 71.6% in 2002 in Concordia, for example (UNDP Argentina 2002). Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




trend, in mid-September 2003, organizations ranging from regional workers’ 
federations and neighbourhood councils to peasant unions and squatters hit the streets 
once more while the trade union movement (COB) announced an indefinite strike, 
demanding the President’s resignation. Over 60 people were killed in clashes between 
security forces and peasants. President Sánchez de Lozada resigned on 17 October 
2003 in the face of genuine fears about further chaos and bloodshed and as prominent 
middle-class intellectuals joined the protest with hunger strikes in churches 
throughout the country (Carter Center 2004). 
 
Causes of Conflict 
This ‘civil society coup’ as such events have come to be known, is just an extreme 
manifestation of the widespread social and political divisions that are tearing Bolivia 
apart and making the job of governing the country almost impossible. The streets are 
regularly packed with protesters over the exploitation of natural gas and the failure to 
bring benefits from this resource to the vast majority of the Bolivian population. 
These protesters in turn are pitted against the businessmen of the eastern region who 
threaten secession if the industry is nationalised. The government is caught in the 
middle. The cocaleros (coca growers) of the Chapare region, led by Evo Morales, 
protest against what they perceive as the government’s adherence to economically 
damaging externally-dictated eradication policies to combat coca production in the 
region, seeing the implementation of such policies as a case of neglect (and at times 
human rights abuse) on the part of the government, and as yet another example of 
domestic needs being subordinated to foreign demands. The government is once again 
caught between the demands of the cocaleros for a living wage and the demands of 
the United States to continue with eradication on pain of losing both related and 
unrelated aid packages.  
 
Another contentious issue is that of land reform. In Bolivia 2 million mostly 
indigenous families work 5 million hectares of land, while less than 100 families own 
25 million hectares between them (Petras 2004). The Agrarian Reform Law provides 
for indigenous communities and individual farmers to have legal title to their lands 
but claims abound from indigenous communities that territories are not defined 
legally or protected. Indigenous groups organised a number of illegal occupations in Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  








The impetus behind this pressure for change relates closely to the perceived failure of 
the country’s political and economic model. Two decades of submissive adherence to 
IMF budgetary policies have generated no significant improvement in Bolivian living 
standards. Bolivia’s poverty rates, which had fallen gradually during the early 1990s 
rose again to 61.2% in 2002, with 37.3% in extreme poverty (UNDP 2004). 
Underemployment is rife and over 60% of jobs are in the informal sector. The real 
minimum wage is just half what it was in 1980 (CEPAL in UNDP 2004). The 
country’s infant mortality is the second highest in Latin America (Justino et al. 2003) 
and life expectancy is still only just over 61 years (UNDP). Bolivians spend an 
average of just five and a half years in school (UNDP 2004) and there is a difference 
of over seven years between the poorest and richest 20%. As a result, ‘many Bolivians 
no longer believe in the promises of free trade and privatisation,’ although viable 
alternatives have not become clear either (ICG 2004, p.18). 
 
Equally damaging –and illustrated most clearly by the downfall of the President in 
2003– is the lack of support for traditional politics and politicians. Bolivia is racked 
with corruption scandals, lack of public faith in a deadlocked Parliament, increasing 
support for non-traditional options in elections and severe fragmentation of political 




Into this political vacuum, a range of social groups has emerged –both nationally and 
at community level– including the cocaleros led by Evo Morales of MAS (Movement 
Toward Socialism), the peasant workers movement (CSUTCB) led by Felipe Quispe 
and the Bolivian Workers Union (COB) led by Jaime Solares, as well as 
neighbourhood organisations in key areas such as El Alto.  
 
                                                 
15 This section draws on ICG (2004). 
16 This first section on the nature and causes of conflict in Bolivia draws on ICG (2004). Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




In particular, indigenous movements are going from strength to strength as they 
mobilise both rural and, increasingly, more urban populations (ICG 2004). The 
indigenous make up 62% of the Bolivian population, dominate the highlands and are 
majorities in La Paz and El Alto. Persistent discrimination against them has left 88% 
living below the poverty line and throughout Bolivia’s history they have rarely held 
positions of government or business authority (Justino et al. 2003). Morales’s 
cocalero movement is dominated by indigenous people. Morales himself has become 
a key player on the national political scene, investing in visits to forgotten highland 
towns and cultivating his relationship with international leaders such as President 
Lula in Brazil. He is currently combining support for Mesa in Congress with rhetoric 
against him in the streets (ICG 2004) and is expected to run for the presidency in the 
next elections. 
 
Although the government tactic of sector-by-sector negotiation has at times left 
groups such as the cocaleros of the Chapare region isolated from other popular 
sectors (Potter & Farthing 2001), many groups have begun to adopt the issues of 
others in addition to their own, and to engage in solidarity strikes and blockades. This 
reflects the growing sense of ‘us and them’ that lines the poor and oppressed up 
against the discriminators in the form of the traditional political and economic elites.
17 
 
Conflict Resolution – National Dialogue
18 
The Catholic Church, the most highly respected institution in the country (UNDP 
2004) has played a role as independent peace broker promoting dialogues for over a 
decade. It has been accompanied in this role by the Ombudsperson’s office, which 
also has a reputation for independence from central government. However, the fact 
that these dialogues were consistently called in response to strikes and protests made 
them prone to failure and in many cases agreements reached were not followed 
through (ICG 2004). 
 
                                                 
17 This section draws on ICG (2004). 
18 This section draws on Dialogue case study reports found on the UNDP’s Democratic Dialogue 
Project website at www.democraticdialoguenetwork.org, on World Bank (no date) and on Carafa Rada 
(2000). Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




In addition to the Church’s traditional conciliatory efforts, there have been two formal 
national dialogues in Bolivia – both of which were structured around the elaboration 
of national development strategies with the additional purpose of establishing trust 
between government and civil society for poverty reduction. In one sense, these 
dialogues can be said to have set out to address a fundamental root cause of conflict. 
However, their narrow focus on poverty reduction meant that key contentious issues, 
such as those of natural gas exploitation or drug eradication policies, for example, and 
key constructive issues for the future, such as governance and national unity, were 
omitted.  
 
The Banzer Government convened the first of these dialogues, Bolivia Toward the 
21
st Century, in September 1997 to try to build consensus among civil society interest 
groups around a medium to long-term national development strategy. The programme 
developed was the ‘General Economic and Social Development plan 1997-2000’ 
(PGDES), which organised a development programme with poverty-reduction at its 
centre around the pillars of equity, opportunity, institutionalism and dignity. The 
second National Dialogue, launched in 2000, again by the Government with support 
from UNDP, focused on the elaboration of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP)
19, responding to a specific requirement that PRSPs be developed using 
participatory mechanisms. As a result of the dialogue, agreement was reached on the 
allocation of HIPC II debt relief resources, economic opportunities were recognised as 
essential for poverty reduction and dialogue was institutionalised – a new Law 
requires the government to convene a dialogue process every three years. Although 
the 2003 dialogue was delayed by the conflict of that year, preparations for the next 
dialogue process began in mid-2004. 
 
The highlight of the Bolivia Toward the 21
st Century dialogue was a National 
Workshop, held in La Paz in Oct 1999, during which civil society organisations and 
other sectors of Bolivian society were invited to contribute to poverty-reduction 
strategy development. In fact, civil society representatives constituted two-thirds of 
participants. Civil society was not, however, invited to participate in municipal level 
                                                 
19 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is an IMF/World Bank framework document for 
external debt relief under the HIPC Initiative and for financing from the IMF Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, and World Bank International Development Association concessional lending facility. Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




discussions. This was improved on during the second national dialogue, which 
involved over 2,000 people from 314 municipalities who participated through 
roundtables at municipal, departmental and national levels. A questionnaire was 
distributed to municipalities with questions on the main social problems of the 
country, nine dialogues were held at departmental level, and the National Mesa used 
the themes considered at the municipal and departmental levels to reach agreement on 
priority actions. Participants in the National Mesa included political parties, 
government, civil society, the church and representatives from the municipalities and 
departments. 
 
Civil society was also able to participate through a parallel Church initiative designed 
to ensure that a full range of voices would be heard. Amid concerns about the second 
Dialogue that included the right of civil society to have access to the same 
information as other actors, to participate in the design of the dialogue methodology 
and focus, and to participate in monitoring and evaluation of policies agreed on 
through the dialogue, the Church decided not to join the dialogue steering committee 
but instead to sponsor a discussion forum – Jubilee 2000 – to promote civil society 
discussion that would later feed into the dialogue. A $400,000 Special Fund to 
support civil society contributions to dialogue provided by UNDP and the 
Governments of Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and the U.K. provided an 
important boost to this initiative. 
 
The Church-backed parallel dialogue, under the banner of ‘Constructing a Human 
Development for All’ worked at a departmental level to organise three-day Forums in 
each of Bolivia’s nine Departments, which in turn fed into the national-level dialogue. 
During these meetings, Working Groups discussed macroeconomic policies and 
structural adjustment; civil participation and human rights; rural/urban education; 
rural/urban health; income and employment; and land and productivity. In addition to 
participating organisations, 350 individuals volunteered their services as consultants 
to guide the process. 
 
The concrete proposal produced through the national-level dialogue in the form of a 
‘Social Control Mechanism’ fed into the PRSP, although the government was Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




selective about the elements it picked up and those it discarded (World Bank no date, 
Bendat no date). Other civil society initiatives included a forum for small and 
medium-sized producers that focused on increasing productivity as a way of reducing 
poverty and regional assemblies with indigenous groups (World Bank no date). 
 
Bolivia’s relatively sophisticated NGO sector has the capacity to research issues and 
engage in public policy formulation rendering its participation far more than a popular 
gimmick. Unfortunately, the government failure to convert many of the ideas and 
plans that emerged from the first dialogue process into effective action had a 
weakening effect on the second process. Key civil society representatives of peasant 
unions and confederations elected not to participate due to a lack of trust carried over 
from the previous dialogue experience (World Bank no date). The presence of 
influential umbrella groups and associations created sources of tension and conflict 
that imposed restraints on PRSP preparation and remained unresolved even after the 
conclusion of the process. In addition, there were persistent complaints about the lack 
of correlation between the second dialogue and the Bolivian PRSP, as the themes of 
health and education were placed on the dialogue agenda without adequate consensus. 
 
The 1997 Dialogue began with a day of presentations of external diagnostics and 
proposals, and presentations by participants from different sectors. This was followed 
by a day of open debate followed by a third day working toward conclusions based on 
the consensus and dissent expressed during the debate (Carafa Rada 2000). 
Discussion was on broad themes rather than specifics.  The process for the 2000 
Dialogue was divided into Social, Economic Development, and Political components. 
Although the more concrete focus and addressing of specific key elements was 
welcomed, there was some criticism of this structure because it compartmentalised 
poverty-reduction according to a social welfare/basic needs model rather than taking a 
broader, more holistic approach as advocated by many civil society organisations 
(World Bank no date, Bendat no date).  
 
These processes were dialogues rather than negotiations in the sense that they 
addressed a broad range of themes in open and creative discussion fora, provided 
opportunities for many different stakeholders to participate (rather than just high-level Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




policy-makers or representatives), and made some efforts to build better 
communication channels and more trusting relationships between government and 
civil society. The fact that the second dialogue was specifically aimed at producing a 
PRSP for Bolivia, however, increased pressure for discussions to follow a set agenda 
and to produce definitive results. It also meant that the dialogue was convened in 
response to an external demand rather than internally driven. It was also noticeable 
that the dialogue was much more open and constructive at the municipal level than at 
the departmental level, where participants were more prone to discourse and to 
clinging to preconceived political and ideological ideas (Carafa Rada 2000). 
 
There are also some complaints that, for both dialogues, ideas discussed were not 
effectively put into practice. One reason for this may be that the PRSP is a document 
designed to secure international funding for a country, which leads governments to try 
to please their potential donors as much as appease their populations. Bolivia, as the 
poorest country in South America, is highly dependent on its regular external aid 
packages and has consistently followed IMF policy guidelines. Distrust of 
government intentions was exacerbated by the non-transparent manner in which they 
prepared and approved the Interim PRSP, in close collaboration with the IMF rather 
than the Bolivian people.  
 
This failure to follow through partly undermined efforts to restore trust in government 
and, as already mentioned, Bolivia continues to suffer from high levels of disillusion 
with politicians and their policies, and from a widespread sense of exclusion from 
effective decision-making power. Mesa’s promises of future dialogue seem to have 
contributed to calming tensions in 2004, however, suggesting that many people still 
have faith in the intrinsic worth of dialogue processes and that carefully designed and 
implemented dialogues – in particular avoiding reiteration of the increasingly 
entrenched positions of different groups – may yet have a role to play in conflict 
prevention in Bolivia. 
 
Finally, the Church also supported a promising effort at national conciliatory dialogue 
in 2002-3 but was ultimately unable to get all key parties to sign the final agreement – 
particularly Morales’ MAS. The failure of these negotiations in many ways Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




foreshadowed the impending removal of Sánchez de Lozada from power, as it 
demonstrated the intransigence of the indigenous movement at that time. 
 
Conclusion 
In terms of their conflict prevention capacity, despite the intrinsic value of inclusive 
debate, it is difficult to imagine dialogues based on such narrow agendas successfully 
resolving conflict based on a range of complex, interlinking issues and identities in 
which a sense of ‘us and them’ solidarity among the ‘oppressed’ has led to regular 
borrowing of issues for solidarity protests. This is even more the case if the agendas 
themselves were not determined through a participatory process. Poverty reduction 
efforts can clearly contribute to reducing instability and unrest in the country, but the 
exclusion of key controversial issues inevitably leaves alternative sources of 
discontent.  
 
One year on from October 2003, Bolivia is still regularly racked by protests and 
blockades from miners, peasants, cocaleros, unionists, anarchists, and indigenous 
groups (Averbach 2004). Mesa has held on for substantially longer than many initially 
predicted, however, which in itself is testimony to his capacity to balance opposing 
forces and to the value of participatory mechanisms in conflict resolution terms. 
Given this precarious context, the future stability of Bolivia depends heavily on 
efforts to strengthen institutions and ensure that the current government is both 
responsive and seen to be so. In terms of future dialogue initiatives, their success 
depends very much on whether the lessons learned through previous processes – 
particularly about the need for breadth and depth in civil society participation and for 
the government to follow through on commitments – have been taken on board and 
are reflected in the National Dialogue and in the Constituent Assembly of 2005. Such 
activity can only do so much, however, and it is clear that fundamental improvements 
in the status of indigenous and other poor groups are a basic requirement for reduction 
of political unrest. The tragedy lies in the fact that every blockade set up in protest has 
a negative impact on the country’s economy, making it ever harder for the Bolivian 
government to respond.  
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The major challenge to understanding conflict patterns in Venezuela is that, while the 
political and social instability the county now suffers from was originally generated 
primarily by a specific pattern of social, economic, and political inequality, that 
configuration has now broken down and the roles of opposition and authority have 
been reversed, at least in the political and social spheres. While the same original 
problems continue to feed into the conflict, it is now perpetuated by a different set of 
causes, interests and needs. Even addressing the acute poverty and inequality that 
Venezuela suffers from, as indeed President Chávez claims to be doing, will not 
resolve the conflict without efforts to address additional factors such as the growing 
fear and insecurity of the opposition, and the lack of adequate accountability and good 
governance. 
 
Chávez won the presidency in 1998 with a massive 56% of vote. This success was 
due to his capacity to channel the discontent that had been building for more than a 
decade. Chávez’s rhetoric of ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ and participatory democracy 
have combined with his approach to social policy to offer a polar opposite to the 
liberal model of economy and government that had generated such a sense of betrayal 
among the Venezuelan poor. He built a new identity for the poor as revolutionaries, 
chavistas and later a whole range of terms (many of them with military overtones) 
associated with different campaigns and programmes. He encouraged them to form 
community organisations, local political groups and the shady ‘bolivarian circles,’ 
which have been implicated in all sorts of violence against opposition supporters. He 
also created a complementary identity for himself as ‘champion of the marginalised’ 
and ‘the people’s President’, emphasising his humble background and indigenous 
roots.  
 
As part of this identity-creation, he placed great emphasis on divisive ‘us and them’ 
rhetoric, lumping all opposition members together as, among other things, ‘oligarcas’ 
or ‘escualidos’, and generalising broadly about their corrupt, selfish, anti-poor 
motivations for maintaining the unacceptable status quo. His pre-election conciliatory 
assurances that he would incorporate all qualified people into his government were 
rapidly discarded. Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  





In the process, a strong opposition identity was generated and entrenched. The private 
media stacked up against government media and this confrontation has fuelled the 
conflict with persistent biased and inflammatory reporting from both sides. Chávez’s 
intransigence and apparent unwillingness to allow the middle-class to consider itself 
part of the Venezuelan people too, and his economic and social policies designed 
explicitly to generate radical change, fed opposition fears for their future. This 
provocation, combined with the fact that many Venezuelans had only recently become 
poorer and retained their sense of social status if not the resources to sustain it, 
resulted in apparent middle-class overreactions to policies that were not necessarily 
bad for them directly. For example, one of the laws passed by presidential decree in 
December 2001 was a land redistribution programme that focused on government 
land but left open the theoretical possibility of incorporating unused private land (in 
return for compensation at market prices) (Carter Center 2004, Wilpert 2004). The 
reactions of many opposition supporters were disproportionate to the actual threat 
posed to them and their property, reflecting concerns about the growing power of the 
president, and strong identification with the opposition ‘group’ and its social, 
economic and political model. 
 
Opposition uprising 
Opposition desperation at what they perceived as discrimination and exclusion on the 
part of Chávez leaving them no alternative channels for representation led to the idea 
that they had to remove Chávez at all costs. This resulted first in persistent protest, 
and then in more sinister methods.  
 
On 10 April 2002, oil, labour, and business leaders extended a three-day national 
strike indefinitely, announcing they intended to continue until Chávez resigned. The 
following day, 150,000 anti-Chávez protesters clashed with government supporters 
and the National Guard. Nineteen people
20 were killed and over a hundred were 
wounded including both government and opposition supporters. Although 
responsibility for the deaths and injuries of 11 April has never been established, at the 
                                                 
20 Figures vary: The Attorney General (www.fiscalia.gov.ve) and Office of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman (www.defensoria.gov.ve) give 19, COFAVIC victim support group (www.cofavic.org.ve) 
gives 17, and Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) gives 18. Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




time, military officers struggling to keep control in the streets of Caracas, blamed the 
government and its deliberate polarization of the nation for the violence. They 
detained Chávez and subsequently announced his resignation – a claim later 
challenged by Attorney General, Isaias Rodríguez, and by Chávez himself.
21 
 
The military proclaimed Fedecámaras President, Pedro Carmona, Acting President of 
the Republic. As soon as he was sworn in, Carmona dismissed the National 
Assembly, fired the Supreme Court and abolished the Constitution. Meanwhile the 
military units who did not support the coup began to proclaim their support for 
Chávez, while the military officers who had put Carmona in power became 
disillusioned with his decisions. On 13 April, after a massive and violent popular 
demonstration by Chávez supporters, Carmona was removed. Chávez was reinstated 
the following day. 
 
On 2 December, the opposition launched a massive general strike that shut down the 
national oil company PDVSA for nearly two months, threatening the economic 
stability of the country and costing the government seven billion dollars in lost 
revenues (Fleischer 2003). Many people thought this would break Chávez but instead 
it allowed him to strengthen his control over the company. He fired all the managers 
on strike and replaced them with people loyal to his regime. He later ordered the 
arrest of the main strike organizers, Ortega and Fernández.  
 
Since this point, opposition efforts to remove Chávez have continued but the national 
negotiation process between government and opposition (see below) has helped to 
ensure that it has followed a more institutionalised path – specifically the exercise of 
the right enshrined in the 1999 Constitution to call for a referendum to remove the 
President after one half of his term has passed. 
 
These military, political and economic efforts to strike back were as much a part of 
the conflict as Chávez’s actions in the first place. The negative economic impact of 
the strike, for example, fed straight back in a vicious dynamic into middle-class 
insecurities about the stability of their economic position. Economic losses from 
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tourism and from investment resulting from street protests and clashes have had a 
similar effect – each side blames the other for the negative consequences. 
 
Causes of Conflict 
The Venezuelan dependence on oil has had a profound impact on its economic, 
cultural and political formation. Booming oil revenues generated expectations about 
government spending that led governments to become heavily indebted under 
pressure to maintain newly established standards once oil income started to decline. 
Oil has also fostered the idea that success in Venezuela depends on access to oil 
wealth – through employment or contracts (Lynn Karl 1997). This clientelist approach 
has produced a bureaucratic system in which around 45% of people in the formal 
economy are employed by the state (Wilpert 2003). 
 
Although Human Development Index figures for Venezuela have improved in recent 
decades, reaching 0.778 in 2002, both poverty and inequality rates have shown 
marked increases since 1990. In 1998, the poorest 20% shared just 3% of income or 
consumption, while the richest 20% shared 53.4% (HDR 2003). The Andres Bello 
Catholic University of Caracas quotes figures for poverty of 33% in 1975 and 70% in 
1995. This has been accompanied by a dramatic decline in real industrial and 
minimum wages to 40% of their 1980 levels by 2000. Urban unemployment peaked at 
15.8% in 2002 (National Institute for Statistics). The informal economy grew from 
34.5% in 1980 to 53% in 1999 (Rodríguez 2004). As with most of Latin America, in 
theory Venezuela has universal public education and basic health care but services are 
often poor and there are often hidden costs involved. By 1998, for example, primary 
school enrolment had fallen to 83%, largely in response to increases in registration 
fees and school material costs (Wilpert 2003). The average number of years spent in 
education in 2000 was just 5.61 (IFAD 2001). 
 
From 1958 onwards, the Venezuelan political elite established a ‘democratic’ power-
sharing agreement that ensured their continuation in power in return for stability and 
for social inclusion and justice to be derived from equitable distribution of the oil rent 
– an arrangement that collapsed along with oil prices and the Venezuelan economy in 
the 1980s. In 1989 newly elected President Carlos Andres Pérez inherited a balance of Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




payment deficit of US$7.8billion, a fiscal deficit of 9.4% of GDP, foreign exchange 
reserves at a critical level, and acutely distorted prices. Pérez responded with an 
orthodox structural adjustment programme. Within a month, after the implementation 
of a 30% increase in petroleum prices, Caracas and other cities were ravaged by 
protests leading to riots and looting. As people came flooding down from the poor 
barrios (urban slums), the military was called in to restore order and brutal state 
repression ensued, causing at least 350 deaths. (López Maya 2002). 
 
This upheaval, commonly referred to as the caracazo, was a clear sign of growing 
social resentment and tensions, largely caused by growing inequality but exacerbated 
by a strong sense of betrayal as the new economic model undermined previous 
promises of inclusion, social justice and support for the poor. The caracazo  also 
affected the Armed Forces. Commonly from lower-class backgrounds themselves, 
many resented having to assume the role of oppressor during the riots, and suffered 
deeply from the popular vilification of the military that ensued. The longer-term 
impact of this experience on Venezuela political stability became clear when, in 1992, 
two separate military groups attempted coups d’êtat, both protesting against 
government corruption and at the neoliberal economic model, and one of which was 
led by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez. President Pérez was impeached in 1993 for 
apparent misuse of state funds – yet another sign of political discontent and further 
indication of the corruption of traditional politics. 
 
Venezuela provides a classic illustration of the negative impact of inequality on 
stability. Even before Chávez’s arrival on the scene, it was clear that pressure for 
change within Venezuelan society was building dramatically and that there was clear 
danger that such change could degenerate into violent conflict. Pardoned by Pérez’s 
successor, Chávez returned to the arena in 1998 offering a way out that initially 
appealed to many intellectuals as well as to the poor he promised to rescue from their 
woes. 
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Conflict Resolution – The Table of Negotiations and Agreements (Mesa de 
Negociaciones y Acuerdos)
22 
After the 2002 coup against him, Chávez initiated a dialogue with his opponents as if 
realizing that completely ignoring or excluding the opposition was no longer practical. 
When that dialogue floundered due to persistently high levels of hostility and 
polarization, Chávez accepted an offer from The Carter Center, the OAS and UNDP 
to facilitate a dialogue between the government and the opposition Democratic 
Coordinator (Coordinadora Democrática). The so-called Tripartite Mission reflected 
the fact that The Carter Center had important credibility with the Government while 
the OAS had substantial credibility with the opposition. UNDP was also recognised as 
a stable presence in the country and a respected source of technical support since long 
before the recent confrontations.  
 
These three international organizations supported the choice of national dialogue as 
an appropriate conflict resolution tool in the circumstances because the idea already 
had the support of the government and later received support in principle from the 
opposition. More importantly, dialogue also set out to address key deficits – the 
absence of a channel of genuine communication among the actors involved, and the 
lack of trust between highly polarized sectors. In this sense, the content of any 
agreement was less important than the fact that people sat down at the same table and 
were able to reach some form of consensus and a non-violent, constitutional means to 
move forward with the process. Communication in a relatively stable, facilitated 
environment with international oversight was invaluable for this. 
 
Talks between government and opposition began in November 2002, amidst 
continuing street marches and continued throughout the following December and 
January despite the ongoing general strike. Indeed, the ultimate failure of the strike to 
dislodge Chávez from power left the opposition with little choice but to try and make 
the negotiations work. The main intention was to move away from the political 
impasse in which the country found itself, with the hope of identifying a concrete 
agenda agreed on by both sides and concrete and measurable agreements to strengthen 
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governability. The form the talks should take was initially disputed, however, with the 
government asking for dialogue with international facilitation and the opposition 
calling for negotiations with international mediation and binding results. After much 
discussion it was called the Table of Negotiation and Agreements. 
 
Six ‘representative’ participants were selected by each side. The opposition included 
representatives of parties, the trade union movement, business leaders and NGOs. 
None of these were the main elected opposition party leaders, who were prepared to 
allow the process to function but did not participate directly in the agreements. In 
addition, each side had a legal advisor. 
 
The OAS Secretary General César Gaviria facilitated the dialogue, with assistance 
from The Carter Center’s Francisco Diez and technical support from UNDP. The 
facilitation played an important role in terms in keeping open channels of 
communication, but the absence of concrete proposals from the actors led the Mesa to 
turn its attention to short-term contextual developments rather than medium or longer-
term solutions. The proposals made by President Jimmy Carter in late January 2003 
focused the discussion on concrete proposals, but it still required three more months 
to arrive at an accord with minimal substantive content. Ultimately, although certain 
elements were consistent with a dialogue approach, the persistently antagonistic 
meetings, the emphasis on finding a solution rather than trust building, the hands-off 
facilitation style and even the participants’ choice of name for the process were more 
consistent with a negotiation approach. 
 
After much effort, the negotiations produced a formal written agreement on 23 May 
2003. The agreement reaffirmed the commitment of all actors to finding a 
constitutional, peaceful, democratic and electoral solution, to respect for the 
constitution and to democratic rights. It agreed on State monopoly on the use of force 
and to undertake a campaign to effectively disarm the civilian population. It agreed to 
the opposition’s right to call on Article 72 of the Constitution – the right to a recall 
referendum on a politician after half his/her term. It agreed on the need for a 
trustworthy, transparent and impartial electoral arbiter for the process and 
acknowledged the OAS, TCC and UNDP offer of assistance and their prior support Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




for the process. It also established a joint follow-up body with two representatives 
from each side to keep open channels of communication (Carter Center 2004, 
Venezuela Accord, 2003).  
 
All in all this amounted to very little in the way of Government concessions but it was 
nevertheless extremely valuable in terms of providing the opposition with a 
‘Constitutional’ mechanism to pursue their desperate goal of removing Chávez from 
office, and some form of guarantee of respect for that path from the Government. 
Both the OAS Mission and the Carter Center have followed up their participation in 
the negotiation process with continued observation of electoral processes, monitoring 
of the situation on the ground and the development of related events, and support for 
the communication and negotiation that kept the process alive. 
 
In the context of extreme polarization, the fact that key political and social sectors 
were prepared to dialogue in order to deactivate the country’s conflicts and strengthen 
rule of law was very positive. In practice, however, although the constitutionally 
provided-for process has been carried out over the past one and a half years, it has not 
generated the hoped-for solution. The antagonistic attitudes and behaviours that have 
deepened the divide and generated persistent high levels of tension have had a clear 
impact on the implementation of the institutional ‘solution’ agreed on at the Mesa. 
The Government has created obstacles for the opposition at every turn, initially 
refusing to accept petition signatures that had been collected before the half-way point 
in Chávez’s term, then developing an elaborate hybrid public-private signature 
collection process and manipulating the verification process that followed to force 
many signatories to turn out at a later date to ‘repair’ their signatures. Despite these 
obstacles, the opposition was eventually granted their referendum on 15 August 2004. 
Despite some pre-election irregularities the international community generally 
recognised Chávez’s victory in the Referendum with just under 60% of the vote amid 
high voter turnout of around 70%. The opposition, however, has still not recognised 
the result, and meanwhile levels of trust in the Venezuelan electoral authorities – the 
National Electoral Council – have been painfully eroded through its opaque, partisan 
decision-making in the past and its incompetent/flawed preparation for each stage in 
the electoral process.  Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  





Alternatives to Violence – Strengthening Peace in Venezuela
23 
In an effort to support the dialogue process, The Carter Center’s Strengthening Peace 
in Venezuela programme (SPV) has worked to overcome the polarisation that has 
permeated all levels of community and family life and develop a movement from 
below that would encourage peace, reconciliation and understanding at all levels of 
society, and would encourage political leaders to work for the same. The SPV 
programme is based on the theories of William Ury, who maintains that the ‘Third 
Side’ consists of anyone who wants a peaceful resolution to a conflict and who could 
influence their peers to take a non-violent and de-escalating approach, using a whole 
range of tools such as listening, mediating, opening communication channels and 
addressing unmet needs. SPV promotes a nationwide network of Venezuelan actors 
dedicated to peace building in Venezuela, and to organising events throughout the 
country, through which The Carter Center hopes that the Venezuelan people will gain 
a sense of ownership over the peace process. Accordingly, SPV acts as a facilitator for 
Paz en Movimiento – a movement of over a hundred organizations, institutions and 
individuals dedicated to trying to reduce the extreme polarization and violence that 
the current political crisis in the country has produced.  
 
SPV has also facilitated roundtable discussions for journalists and other members of 
the mass media on ‘Reflections on the Role of the Journalism in the Current 
Situation.’ William Ury and Carter Center facilitator Francisco Diez have both 
worked directly on trust-building exercises with key media owners and editors, at 
times incorporating the government and the electoral authorities, as well as on 
specific initiatives to lay ground rules for more responsible reporting. These meetings 
have ranged from formal talks through to informal workshops and discussions. During 
the August 2004 recall referendum campaign, media reporting was monitored for bias 
by the Media Monitoring Group and, despite persistent problems, significant 
improvements were noted as a direct result of meetings held during the build-up. The 
media have been used to fan the flames of the conflict since early on in Chávez’s time 
in office, making these initiatives an absolutely essential element of conflict 
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The situation in Venezuela is highly complex because of the way in which the 
dynamics of conflict have modified the driving forces behind it, meaning that conflict 
prevention and resolution efforts now need to address not only the original root causes 
but also the causes generated by the conflict itself – particularly middle class fear and 
anger at the lack of respect and apparent lack of inclusion they are suffering under 
Chávez. The Table of Negotiations and Agreements – the supposed dialogue 
illustration in this case – did not make a significant contribution in this area, although 
it did at least promote the search for an institutional solution rather than recourse to 
violence. Social polarisation has reached such a level that there is also a desperate 
need to address Venezuelan attitudes to conflict more generally to promote a win-win 
approach designed to promote long-term stability and harmony. 
 
Unfortunately, Chávez’s recent electoral victories – both in the recall referendum 
against him and in recent regional elections – have left him with little incentive to 
appease the opposition. This imbalance bodes ill for future reconciliation efforts. On 
the other hand, opposition political bankruptcy seems to be leading them to moderate 
their approach, and in particular to talk about addressing the needs of the poor who 
support Chávez. If they can offer a viable alternative, balance can be restored to the 
Venezuelan political scene and the genuine advances made under Chavez in terms of 
awareness of, and support for, the needs of the poor, as well as in terms of widespread 




It is clear in all three of these cases that inequality had some role to play in 
precipitating protest and unrest. Beyond this simple statement, however, there are 
considerable differences between the cases, even in terms of the types of inequality 
that are relevant. In Argentina, for example, while the piqueteros  responded to 
persistent discrimination over an extended period, the predominantly middle-class Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




cacerolazos banging their pans in the street did so primarily in response to immediate 
and personal economic losses brought about by the devaluation of the peso. Although 
their protests blamed current politicians for their losses, they were not driven by any 
strong sense of discrimination against them as a group, or of persistent exclusion from 
political decision-making – i.e. political inequality. In contrast, Bolivian street 
protests are very clearly driven both by a sense of economic disadvantage to specific 
groups –the indigenous generally, the coca growers, peasant farmers, labourers, 
teachers, etc.– exacerbated by government policies, and a sense of long-term political 
exclusion prohibiting changes to those policies. Protests in Venezuela followed a 
similar pattern initially but the dynamic of the conflict shifted with the election of 
Chávez in 1998.  After this point roles were reversed and protests were taken up by 
Chávez’s predominantly middle-class opposition who were objecting primarily to 
political exclusion that could be considered a temporary form of political inequality 
(in this case a significant change from their previous status). They also objected to 
economic policies perceived to place them at a disadvantage but this could not 
realistically be considered to constitute an objection to economic inequality, although 
the grievance was amplified by economic downturn blamed on Chávez and fed also 
by the negative impacts of their own protests, such as the 2-month strike.  
 
All three cases also exhibit the influence of bankrupt economic and political models 
and their failure to produced promised benefits, as an impetus for change. Likewise, 
in all three cases, and particularly in Bolivia, protest is clearly linked to civil society 
responses to their perceived inability to bring about change in any other way. 
However, the impact of the social learning that has demonstrated the effectiveness of 
street protest –again particularly in Bolivia– should not be underestimated. It may be 
the case that street protest would now be selected as a strategy even if there were 
alternative mechanisms because of its consistent success in achieving its goals. 
 
In all three countries dialogue had a positive symbolic impact. In Venezuela it 
reintroduced the concept of an institutional way out of the conflict and, despite the 
lack of willingness of participants to truly engage in dialogue, it at least gave the 
public impression that both government and opposition were prepared to seek a 
solution to the impasse. In Argentina it not only led to subsequent national dialogues Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




with considerable popular support but also led to the introduction of dialogue 
methodologies at other levels of government. In Bolivia it led to the 
institutionalisation of dialogue processes in government. In Bolivia, however, 
complaints about the failure to incorporate certain agreed elements into policy 
generated some disillusion in the process that weakened subsequent dialogue efforts. 
 
Despite this symbolism, it is difficult to determine whether these dialogues truly 
transformed relationships, with the exception of the Venezuelan case in which they 
almost certainly did not. Neither the persistence of protest in Bolivia, nor the 
reduction of protest in Argentina, is a definitive indicator of the impact of the 
dialogue on relationships. Argentina seems to offer the most effective example of 
dialogue use as a reconciliation tool but the dialogue’s success must be measured 
against the relative superficiality of the crisis as compared with the deep-rooted 
structural discrimination behind the Bolivian and Venezuelan upheavals. The relative 
simplicity of the crisis, plus the effectiveness of the government’s policy responses to 
the crisis, made it much easier for the Argentine dialogue to address key issues and 
contribute to stabilisation. The contribution of the Bolivian dialogues to conflict 
prevention was limited by their narrow focus but equally it would have been 
extremely difficult –although perhaps necessary– to organise a dialogue to encompass 
all factors disturbing Bolivian society. In Venezuela, the ‘dialogue’ did not even 
attempt to address structural issues but instead to look for some way to break the 
stalemate between government and opposition, with both sides looking to gain 
maximum benefit from the negotiations rather than allow any significant changes to 
the relationship between them. While in theory civil society participated, in practice 
those CSO participants lined up along the same lines as the politicians and any 
dissident voices were noticeably absent from the process.  
 
These cases make clear some of the difficulties faced in promoting dialogue, even in a 
region such as Latin America in which there is widespread enthusiasm for such 
initiatives. While such dialogues can encourage local ownership of solutions, can 
offer mechanisms that recognise distinct identities, and can constitute valuable 
attempts to address political inequalities while responding to social and economic 
needs, they do not take place in a vacuum and they must therefore not only respond to Prepared as a Background Paper for the UN Human Development Report 2005  




the unique political and social circumstances in which they take place but must also 
struggle against the limitations that such circumstances place on them. 
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